

Message Text

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ACTION ACDA-12

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TO SECSTATE WASHDC 3136
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AMEMBASSY BONN
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USNMR SHAPE BRUSSELS BEL
USCINCEUR VAIHINGEN GER

S E C R E T SECTION 1 OF 3 MBFR VIENNA 0451

LIMDIS

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: PARM, NATO, MBFR
SUBJ: MBFR: BILATERAL DISCUSSION WITH SOVIET REPS ON JULY 18, 1978

REF: MBFR VIENNA 0449

1. SUMMARY: US DEP REP MET ON JULY 18 AT SOVIET
INVITATION WITH SOVIET REPS TARASOV AND SHUSTOV FOR A CUSTOMARY
END-OF-ROUND REVIEW. CONVERSATION FOCUSED ON THE DATA ISSUE.
THERE WAS NO INDICATION OF GIVE ON SOVIET PART. IN SOMEWHAT
MODIFIED FORM, TARASOV AGAIN RAISED HIS IDEA THAT PARTICIPANTS
SHOULD DROP EFFORTS TO AGREE ON STARTING DATA AND ON THE PRECISE
AMOUNT OF REDUCTIONS BY PARTICIPANTS, AND INSTEAD SHOULD UNDER-
TAKE COMMITMENT NOT TO EXCEED AGREED LEVELS. CONVERSATION
INDICATED THAT TARASOV HAS ADOPTED, AT LEAST FOR PURPOSE OF
ARGUMENTATION, WESTERN CONCEPT THAT THE WAY TO DEAL WITH DATA
ISSUE WAS TO IDENTIFY THE DISTRIBUTION OF THE DISCREPANCY

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BETWEEN EASTERN AND WESTERN FIGURES.

END SUMMARY

2. TARASOV ASKED US DEP REP FOR HIS APPRAISAL OF
SITUATION IN NEGOTIATIONS. US DEP REP SAID THE SITUATION AFTER
THE WESTERN PROPOSALS OF APRIL 19 AND EASTERN PROPOSALS OF JUNE

8 WAS BETTER THAN IT HAD BEEN FOR SOME TIME. MANY PROBLEMS HAD BEEN PARTIALLY RESOLVED IN THE SENSE OF AGREEMENT IN PRINCIPLE, BUT THE MEANS CHOSEN BY THE EAST TO IMPLEMENT THESE AGREEMENTS IN PRINCIPLE HAD CAUSED NEW PROBLEMS. ABOVE ALL, THERE WAS NO PROGRESS ON DATA. IN THIS CONTEXT, IT HAD BEEN OF INTEREST THAT, ALTHOUGH THE EAST COULD HAVE DONE OTHERWISE, IT HAD CHOSEN TO FORMULATE ITS JUNE 8 PROPOSALS IN A WAY WHICH FOCUSED ON DATA. THIS SUGGESTED THAT THE EAST MIGHT EITHER BE WILLING TO GO INTO GREATER DETAIL ON DATA THAN HERETOFORE OR THAT THE EAST THOUGHT THAT THE WEST WOULD RELINQUISH ITS POSITION ON DATA. THE LATTER WOULD NOT HAPPEN. WESTERN REPS CONSIDERED THAT THE DATA PROBLEM WAS ONE FOR THE SOVIETS TO RESOLVE. ONLY THE EASTERN REPRESENTATIVES KNEW THE DETAILS OF HOW THE FIGURES WHICH THEY HAD TABLED HAD BEEN COMPOSED. THE LOGICAL WAY TO FIND THE SOURCE OF THE DISCREPANCY BETWEEN WESTERN AND EASTERN FIGURES ON WARSAW PACT MANPOWER WAS TO DEVELOP A FULL PROFILE OF EACH NATIONAL FORCE AND THEN TO FOCUS FURTHER INQUIRY ON THE AREAS OF GREATEST DISCREPANCY DEVELOPED BY THAT PROFILE. BUT THE WARSAW PACT PARTICIPANTS HAD HITHERTO NOT BEEN PREPARED TO FOLLOW THIS LOGICAL COURSE. DID THE FORMULATION OF THEIR JUNE 8 PROPOSALS MEAN THAT THEY NOW WERE PREPARED TO GO FURTHER IN PROVIDING MORE DETAILED DATA?

3. TARASOV REPLIED THAT IT WAS ALL THE SAME TO HIM WHETHER PARTICIPANTS CONTINUED THE DATA DISCUSSION OR DROPPED IT. THE MOST IMPORTANT THING WAS TO HAVE SOME UNDERSTANDING TO
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SERVE AS A BASIS FOR AN AGREEMENT. THE EAST HAD NEVER ACCEPTED THE WESTERN IDEA OF DISPARITIES BECAUSE IT CONTRADICTED WHAT IN THE EAST VIEW WERE THE REALITIES OF THE SITUATION. THE EAST WAS WILLING EITHER TO CONTINUE THE DATA DISCUSSION OR TO USE ANOTHER APPROACH. THE SOVIETS HAD ALREADY SUGGESTED ANOTHER APPROACH. IT WOULD BE TO FREEZE THE MANPOWER OF EACH SIDE AT 900,000 MEN OVERALL AND 700,000 FOR GROUND FORCES AS OF A FUTURE DATE TO BE AGREED, IRRESPECTIVE OF HOW MANY MEN PARTICIPANTS NOW HAD. AFTER THE AGREED DATE, SAY 1979 OR 1980, NO ONE WOULD HAVE THE RIGHT TO HAVE MORE MEN IN THE AREA THAN THE AGREED LEVELS. THERE WOULD BE AN AGREED MECHANISM TO CHECK THAT THESE LEVELS WERE BEING RESPECTED. BUT WESTERN REPS HAD NOT AGREED TO THIS CONCEPT WHEN TARASOV HAD RAISED IT EARLIER. BECAUSE THE WEST DID NOT AGREE, PARTICIPANTS WERE FORCED TO CONTINUE THE DATA DISCUSSION.

4. TARASOV CONTINUED THAT, AS SOVIET REPS HAD CLEARLY EXPRESSED IN THE TWO PREVIOUS ROUNDS, THEY DID NOT SEE ANY USE IN DIVIDING UP THE DATA ENDLESSLY INTO MORE DETAILED SEGMENTS. WHEN SOVIET REPS HAD DISCUSSED THE ORAL FORMULA USED PRIOR TO THE LAST EXCHANGE OF DATA, THEY HAD CLEARLY INDICATED THAT THEY DID NOT INTEND TO PROVIDE EVERMORE DETAILED FIGURES. THIS WAS

BECAUSE THEY COULD NOT UNDERSTAND HOW MORE DETAILED DATA WOULD HELP PARTICIPANTS. PROVIDING MORE DETAILED FIGURES WOULD MERELY MEAN, THAT INSTEAD OF DISAGREEING WITH THE OVERALL FIGURES, THE WEST WOULD NOT AGREE WITH THE INDIVIDUAL DETAILED FIGURES PRESENTED BY THE EAST. IF THE EAST SAID A PLATOON AMOUNTED TO 100 MEN, THEN THE WEST WOULD SAY IT AMOUNTED TO 120 MEN. IT WOULD BE A MORE PRODUCTIVE METHOD IF THE WEST WOULD SAY WHAT IT HAD COUNTED. THE EASTERN REPS COULD THEN TELL THE WEST WHETHER THESE FIGURES WERE RIGHT OR WRONG.

5. TARASOV SAID, AT PRESENT, EASTERN REPS HAD THE FEELING THAT THE WEST MIGHT HAVE INCLUDED IN ITS COUNT SOME CATEGORIES OF PERSONNEL WHICH PARTICIPANTS ON BOTH SIDES HAD ALREADY INFORMALLY AGREED TO EXCLUDE. SO PERHAPS ONE
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SHOULD CHECK MORE CAREFULLY WHETHER THIS WAS THE CASE. THE WEST SHOULD TABLE ITS FIGURES ON THE TOTAL MANPOWER OF EACH OF THE EASTERN COUNTRIES. THEN DISCUSSION COULD CONCENTRATE ON THOSE NATIONAL FORCES WHERE THE DISCREPANCY WAS LARGEST. UP TO NOW, THE WEST HAD NOT BEEN READY TO DO THIS. TARASOV REPEATED SEVERAL TIMES HIS COMMENT THAT BY PROVIDING WESTERN DATA ON PACT FORCES AND BY EASTERN COMMENTS ON THAT WESTERN DATA, IT WOULD BE POSSIBLE TO DEVELOP A CLEAR PICTURE

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LIMDIS

OF THE DISTRIBUTION OF THE DISCREPANCY. US DEP REP SAID HE DID NOT SEE HOW THIS SORT OF APPROACH COULD HAVE ANY VALUE AT ALL UNLESS THE EAST WERE PREPARED TO PRESENT ITS OWN DATA ON THE SAME FORCE COMPONENTS. OVERALL NATIONAL TOTALS FOR EASTERN PARTICIPANT WOULD NOT BE VERY USEFUL FOR ESTABLISHING A PROFILE OF THE DISCREPANCY WITHIN THOSE FORCES. TARASOV SAID THIS WOULD BE A LOGICAL FIRST STEP. THE EAST HAD MADE AVAILABLE ITS NATIONAL TOTALS FOR ITS FORCES. NOW THE WEST SHOULD MAKE AVAILABLE ITS TOTALS FOR EASTERN PARTICIPANTS. ALSO, EXCHANGE OF FIGURES ON MANNING LEVELS MIGHT BE USEFUL OR MIGHT NOT HAVE ANY VALUE, BUT THE ONLY WAY WAS TO TRY IT. THE WEST HAD GIVEN NO ANSWER ON THIS TOO.

6. TARASOV SAID EASTERN REPS HAD CONSIDERED FROM THE BEGINNING THAT THE WEST'S UNDERLYING POLICY WAS TO DEMAND LARGER EASTERN REDUCTIONS THAN WESTERN REDUCTIONS. THIS MEANT
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THAT THE WEST DID NOT REALLY WANT AN UNDERSTANDING ON DATA, BUT RATHER AN INTERMINABLE DISCUSSION OF DATA UNTIL THE EAST AGREED TO THESE LARGER REDUCTIONS, WHICH IT WOULD NOT DO. UNTIL THE WEST WAS PREPARED TO EXCHANGE THE DATA WHICH THE EAST HAD ALREADY SUGGESTED, THE EAST WOULD NOT SUBMIT AN FURTHER DATA.

7. TARASOV CONTINUED THAT THE WEST HAD MADE NO ATTEMPT THROUGHOUT THE NEGOTIATION TO CORRECT ITS OWN ESTIMATES EVEN WHEN THE EAST HAD DEMONSTRATED THAT THEY WERE INCORRECT. WHAT DID IT MEAN THAT THE WEST WAS TRYING TO INCLUDE CERTAIN CATEGORIES OF FORCES IN ITS COUNT OF EASTERN GROUND FORCES WHEN IT HAD COUNTED EXACTLY THE SAME KIND OF PERSONNEL IN WESTERN AIR FORCES? THE WEST HAD INCLUDED THE POLISH SEA COAST DIVISION IN ITS FIGURES AND SHOWN NO INCLINATION TO CHANGE THAT EITHER. THE WEST HAD AVOIDED THE DISCUSSION OF ALLOCATION BETWEEN GROUND AND AIR ALTHOUGH THE EAST HAD RAISED IT AGAIN. HERE ONE MIGHT FIND SOME POSSIBILITY OF ADJUSTING THE WESTERN FIGURES IF BOTH SIDES USED THE SAME COUNTING METHOD. BUT THE WEST DID NOT WANT TO MAKE ANY ADJUSTMENTS IN ITS DATA. ITS SOLE DESIRE WAS TO PROVE A LARGE DISPARITY AND FORCE THE EAST TO REDUCE MORE THAN IT SHOULD. THIS APPROACH WOULD NOT LEAD TO RESULTS.

8. US DEP REP SAID THE WEST WANTED AGREEMENT ON

THE FACTS. SOVIET REPS WERE PERFECTLY AWARE THAT THE WEST WOULD NOT REVEAL ITS INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION. EVEN IF IT DID SO, THE EAST WOULD DECLARE IT WRONG, JUST AS TARASOV HAD CLAIMED THE WEST WOULD DO IF THE EAST PROVIDED FURTHER FIGURES. THIS WAS SO BECAUSE UNDERLYING THE EASTERN POSITION ON DATA WAS EASTERN OPPOSITION TO TAKING LARGER MANPOWER REDUCTIONS THAN THE WEST. BUT THE EAST WOULD HAVE TO RECONCILE ITSELF TO DOING THIS IF
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THERE WAS TO BE AGREEMENT. THE EAST HAD MORE MEN THAN THE WEST IN THE AREA. THE SOVIET UNION WAS CLOSE, AND THE WEST HAD OFFERED ENOUGH TO COUNTERBALANCE THE INCREASED MANPOWER.

9. TARASOV MENTIONED THE COMMENTS MADE BY US DEP REP ON EAST'S DATA IN THE 17 JULY PLENARY SESSION. HE HAD NOT STUDIED THESE FIGURES CAREFULLY, BUT HE DID THINK THAT MANNING LEVELS MIGHT ACCOUNT FOR THE PROBLEM. US DEP REP SAID THIS ASPECT HAD BEEN TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT IN THESE WESTERN COMMENTS.

10. TARASOV RETURNED TO THE ISSUE OF THE WEST'S PROVIDING ITS DATA ON THE EAST. THE EAST WAS AT A DISADVANTAGE. IT DID NOT HAVE WESTERN FIGURES TO COMPARE WITH THE DATA IT HAD PRESENTED. IT DID NOT KNOW WHAT IT WAS UP AGAINST IN TERMS OF WESTERN EXPECTATIONS. THE WEST SHOULD PROVIDE ITS FIGURES, THEN PARTICIPANTS WOULD DEVELOP A PROFILE OF THE DISCREPANCY. THE WEST COULD CHANGE ITS FIGURES ON EASTERN GROUND FORCES WHERE ALLOCATION BETWEEN GROUND AND AIR WAS CONCERNED BECAUSE, AFTER ALL, IT WOULD BE AN ISSUE OF APPLYING THE DEFINITION DIFFERENTLY. THE EAST TOO COULD NOT CHANGE ITS FIGURES UNLESS THERE WAS A CHANGE IN CATEGORIES. (COMMENT: TARASOV GAVE NO

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INFO USMISSION USNATO

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LIMDIS

FURTHER EXPLANATION OF THIS REMARK.) FOR ITS PART, THE WEST HAD MADE NO MOVE SINCE THE OUTSET OF THE NEGOTIATIONS TO CHANGE ITS FIGURES EXCEPT UPWARD. IT HAD NOT ADJUSTED ITS CATEGORIES EVEN WHEN THE EAST HAD DEMONSTRATED IT WAS JUSTIFIABLE TO DO SO.

11. US DEP REP SAID THE EAST SHOULD RECONCILE ITSELF TO PROVIDING MORE DATA ON ITS FORCES. HE ASKED TARASOV WHETHER THE SOVIETS HAD DONE ANY MORE THINKING ABOUT VERIFICATION. TARASOV SAID THEY HAD NOT. THEY HAD BEGUN TO DEVELOP THEIR IDEAS ON ASSOCIATED MEASURES AND HAD WORKED OUT FOUR PRINCIPLES BUT HAD AS YET GONE NO FURTHER. THE PRINCIPLES WERE: (1) MEASURES SHOULD APPLY TO ALL DIRECT PARTICIPANTS AND EQUALLY, (2) MEASURES SHOULD BE SIMPLE AND PRACTICAL AND NOT COMPLICATE NORMAL MILITARY ACTIVITIES UNDULY, (3) MEASURES SHOULD BE DIRECTLY AND STRICTLY ASSOCIATED WITH REDUCTIONS AND LIMITATIONS AND NOT GET INTO OTHER AREAS NO MATTER

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HOWEVER WORTHWHILE, AND (4) THESE MEASURES SHOULD BE PART OF A PHASE I AGREEMENT AND COVER BOTH PHASES. (COMMENT: TARASOV DESCRIBED SIMILAR PRINCIPLES TO THE TURKISH REP JULY 7, MBFR VIENNA A-88.)

12. US DEP REP SAID TARASOV HAD TOLD UK REP (REFTEL) THAT HE, TARASOV, HAD INFORMATION THAT THERE MIGHT BE AN ATTEMPT ON THE PART OF THE US TO WITHDRAW THAT PART OF THE WESTERN DECEMBER 1975 OFFER WHICH COVERED REDUCTION AND LIMITATION OF NUCLEAR WARHEADS AND THAT THIS WAS CONNECTED WITH A DESIRE TO DEPLOY NEUTRON WARHEADS TO EUROPE. US DEP REP SAID HE HAD NOT HEARD OF ANY SUCH PLAN. WHAT WAS THE BASIS FOR THESE STATEMENTS? TARASOV SAID THERE WAS DAILY INFORMATION ABOUT US PLANS ON THE NEUTRON WARHEAD IN THE WESTERN PRESS. THE US SENATE

HAD APPROVED THE BUDGET FOR THE PREPARATION OF THESE WARHEADS. HE DID NOT SEE ANY REASON WHY THE SOVIETS SHOULD BE EXPECTED TO SIT QUIETLY AND ALLOW THESE DEVELOPMENTS TO TAKE PLACE AGAINST THE INTERESTS OF REACHING AN AGREEMENT. HE INTENDED TO TRY TO WORK AGAINST IT AND IN THIS SENSE PLANNED TO DEAL WITH THIS TOPIC IN HIS PLENARY STATEMENT ON JULY 19.

13. US DEP REP SAID TARASOV'S REMARKS WERE BASED ON MISUNDERSTANDING OF THE FACTS. THERE HAD BEEN NO DECISION TO PRODUCE ER WARHEADS. MOREOVER, THE METHOD TARASOV HAD CHOSEN TO RAISE THIS TOPIC APPEARED AIMED AT SPLITTING AND DIVIDING THE ALLIES. DEP REP COULD SAY NOW THAT THIS APPROACH WOULD NOT WORK AND THAT ITS CONTINUATION COULD ONLY UNDERMINE THE CREDIBILITY OF SOVIET CLAIMS TO WISH TO MOVE THE NEGOTIATIONS FORWARD.

14. US DEP REP PLANS TO GIVE ABOVE REPORT TO UK AND FRG REPS ON JULY 21 ACCOMPANIED BY REQUEST TO TREAT THE
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